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ABSTRACT: It is an under-appreciated fact that Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic 
distinctionwhen coupled with some other plausible and related viewsimplies that 
there are serious difficulties in demarcating empirical theories from pure mathematical 
theories within the Quinean framework.  This is a serious problem because there seems to 
be a principled difference between the two disciplines that cannot apparently be captured 
in the orthodox Quienan framework.  For the purpose of simplicity let us call this Quine’s 
problem of demarcation.  In this paper this problem will be articulated and it will be 
shown that the typical sorts of responses to this problem are all unworkable within the 
Quinean framework.  It will then be shown that the lack of resources to solve this 
problem within the Quinean framework implies that Quine’s version of the 
indispensability argument cannot get off the ground, for it presupposes the possibility of 
making such a distinction. 
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1. Introduction 
It is an under-appreciated fact that Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction—when coupled with some other plausible and related views—implies 
that there are serious difficulties in demarcating empirical theories from pure 
mathematical theories within the Quinean framework.1 This is a serious problem 
because there seems to be a principled difference between the two disciplines that 
cannot apparently be captured in the orthodox Quinean framework. For the 
purpose of simplicity let us call this Quine’s problem of demarcation. In this paper 
this problem will be articulated and it will be shown that the typical sorts of 
responses to this problem are all unworkable within the Quinean framework. It 
will then be shown that the lack of resources to solve this problem within the 
Quinean framework undermines Quine’s version of the indispensability argument, 
for it presupposes the possibility of such a distinction. 
 
                                                        
1 See W.V.O. Quine “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 20-43. 
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2. Quine and the Problem of Demarcating Science and Mathematics 
Quine is duly famous for his critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction in his 
1951 article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” despite persistent disagreement about 
the significance of this work. Nevertheless, given Quine’s criticism of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, Quine (and those who follow in his naturalistic 
footsteps) regard all statements as being empirical in character in some important 
sense. Thus, every statement is supposed to be subject to revision in light of 
empirical evidence. Of course, this is not news to us today, but what this implies 
about teasing apart pure mathematics from empirical theory has not been properly 
appreciated.  What it immediately and most obviously implies is that Quineans 
cannot discriminate pure mathematics from empirical science by asserting that the 
propositions that make up mathematical theories are analytic, whereas the 
propositions that make up empirical theories are synthetic. This is troubling 
because in practice there appears to be a quite sharp distinction between the 
practices of mathematics and the empirical sciences. Presumably we would then 
like to be able to partition the complete body of known statements K into M––the 
mathematical statements––and E––the empirical statements, such that E  K and 
M  K.  But, in order to accomplish this task, a plausible criterion C that grounds 
the distinction between the elements of E and M must exist. This figure captures 
the necessary distinction: 
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Here, according to the Quinean view, we are only to adopt ontological 
commitment to those claims that lay within the E regions of K. What we then 
need, in the spirit of Quine’s “no entity without identity” dictum, is a criterion of 
identity that could demarcate mathematical statements from empirical statements 
(and thereby also a related criterion to demarcate the statements of pure 
mathematics from those of applied mathematics). Without such an identity 
criterion, Quineans would violate their own ontological scruples. Quine’s criticism 
of the analytic/synthetic distinction immediately shows that Quineans cannot use 
analyticity as the criterion for demarcating mathematical statements from 
empirical statements in K and so we must look elsewhere if we are to solve the 
Quinean problem of demarcation 
This inability to discriminate pure mathematics from empirical science on 
the basis of the analytic/synthetic distinction in the Quinean framework is then 
exacerbated further when it is also recognized that traditional methodological 
accounts of pure mathematics are wildly unrealistic and depend on the viability of 
a workable notion of a priority. Those accounts typically treat the methodology of 
pure mathematics as the development of necessarily true axiomatic systems where 
theorems are proved on the basis of the axioms by the use of a priori methods, but 
this is simply not true of the actual practice of mathematics as numerous 
philosophers of mathematics have now come to realize. Lakatos in particular is 
largely responsible for this recognition.2   
More importantly, Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction 
also simultaneously eliminates the viability of using either the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction or the necessary/contingent distinction as the basis for demarcating 
empirical science from pure mathematics because, at least for Quineans, as a result 
of the collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction, there is no a priori knowledge 
and there are no necessarily true propositions. Quine held that the class of analytic 
truths is the just the class of a priori knowable truths and the class of a priori 
knowable truth is just the class of necessary truths. Similarly, the class of synthetic 
truths is just the class of a posteriori knowable truths and the class of a posteriori 
knowable truths is just the class of contingent truths. But according to Quine there 
                                                        
2 See Imre Lakatos, “Proofs and Refutations,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 
(1963-4): 1-25, 120-139, 221-243, 296, 342, Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations (Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press, 1976) and Imre Lakatos, “A Renaissance of Empiricism in the 
Recent Philosophy of Mathematics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (1976): 201-
223.    
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are no analytic truths and so there are no truths that are knowable a priori and 
there are no necessary truths. So, as we saw earlier Quineans cannot use the 
analytic/synthetic distinction to do the work of C and for the same basic reason 
they can use neither the a priori/a posteriori distinction nor the 
necessary/contingent distinction to do the work of C. Moreover, they cannot use 
any criterion that employs any of these conceptual distinctions, for there are no 
such distinctions according to Quine.3 
Yet more troubling still is the recognition that Quine’s rejection of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction also implies a radical sort of confirmational holism, 
whereby the whole of our system of beliefs is the proper unit of confirmation 
relative to observational data.4 In other words the whole body of our beliefs is at 
issue when it comes to the issue of confirmation. This means that when we 
consider the acceptability of our beliefs it must be done in a global manner and 
when our system of beliefs conflicts with observational data we are then 
confronted with the infamous Quine/Duhem thesis.5 This is the assertion that 
                                                        
3 Quine makes an alternative and more mature attempt to specify C later on in W. V. O. Quine, 
From Stimulus to Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 52-57. There he 
argues that the distinction between empirical statements and those of pure mathematics can 
perhaps be established as follows. Empirical statements and sets of empirical statements imply 
observation categoricals, whereas the statements of pure mathematics individually and jointly do 
not. This suggestion is variously problematic as follows. First, this approach fails to specify a 
defining feature of specifically mathematical statements, as opposed to other non-empirical 
statements. Moreover, it makes the statements of pure mathematics meaningless and devoid of 
truth values given his adherence to the view that all semantic content is ultimately grounded 
empirically. Finally, semantic content is typically generated only by sets of statements that must 
involve at least some empirical claims, but in Quine’s system there is no way in practice tease 
apart which statements in a testable set with semantic content are specifically conferring the 
empirical content on that set. This is due to his subscription to a form of semantic holism.  We 
cannot in most cases selectively and sequentially delete statements and then check to see if 
semantic content remains and this is simply because critical semantic mass is not a property of 
single sentences (From Stimulus to Science, 48-49). Elsewhere, he famously tells us that “It is 
misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement (“Two Dogmas,” 43),” 
and also that “the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science (“Two Dogmas,” 42).” In 
fact, Quine admits all of these charges (From Stimulus to Science, 55-57) and so even he 
acknowledges that this approach is problematic. 
4 In Quine’s later work this more extreme view is relaxed and Quine holds that “large” chunks of 
our systems of belief are the units of confirmation. See W.V.O. Quine, “Five Milestones of 
Empiricism,” (1975) reprinted in Theories and Things (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1981). 
5 See W.V.O. Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970) and W.V.O. 
Quine and Joseph Ullian, The Web of Belief (New York: Random House, 1970). 
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when our holistic system of beliefs is faced with empirical falsification, we must 
give up something to restore consistency, but that there is nothing in particular we 
must give up. We can give up the observation statement itself or one or more 
theoretical beliefs that give rise to the contradiction. As a result, when our system 
of beliefs is faced with falsification we must give something up, but we can 
typically restore consistency in a number of ways by adjusting our beliefs. This 
view then also undermines the principled possibility of using the concept of 
revisability to make the distinction between the statements of mathematics and 
those of science. 
What is the of great interest is that in discussing the role of mathematics and 
its ontology in the context of its application in empirical theory, Quine––along 
with Putnam––subscribed to the infamous indispensability arguments.6 Such 
indispensability arguments take the following generic form: 
P1: We ought to have ontological commitments to all and only entities that are 
indispensible to our best scientific theories. 
P2: Mathematical entities are indispensible to our best scientific theories. 
Therefore, we ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities. 
These arguments essentially conclude that our ontological commitments to 
the existence of mathematical entities should be on a par with our ontological 
commitments to the theoretical entities appealed to in empirical theories because 
indispensable mathematical propositions employed in such theorizing accrue 
confirmation holistically when the empirical propositions in question are 
confirmed. That is to say, all of the propositions used in some given empirical 
endeavor––including those that are a part of mathematics––accrue confirmation 
jointly because no proposition can be confirmed in isolation and mathematics is in 
some crucially important sense indispensable to the conduct of the work of the 
empirical sciences.   
But this also means that the difference between the statements of pure 
mathematics and the statements of the empirical sciences also cannot be grounded 
                                                        
6 For the origin of the indispensability arguments see W.V.O. Quine, “On What There Is,” 
Review of Metaphysics 2 (1948): 21-38, “Two Dogmas,” Word and Object (New York, MIT Press, 
1960), “Carnap and Logical Truth,” Synthese 12 (1960): 350-374, Ontological Relativity and 
Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), Theories and Things (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), Hilary Putnam, Philosophy of Logic (New York: Allen and 
Unwin, 1972), Mathematics, Matter and Method, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979). For discussion of these arguments see Mark Colyvan, The 
Indispensability of Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Penelope Maddy, 
Realism in Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 
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in the differing ontological attitudes towards the referents of mathematical 
statements and the referents of empirical statements, for what we should take to 
exist is just what our best total theory of the world indicates as existing.7 So given 
the Quinean stance on ontology the criterion C cannot be difference in ontological 
attitude, for there are no such differences. But, commitment to the indispensability 
arguments strongly indicates that Quine and those who follow his lead must 
identify some principled manner by which mathematical propositions can be 
distinguished from other propositions. Otherwise, the indispensability arguments 
verge on being nonsensical, for their very formulation depends on such a 
distinction. In the indispensability argument both P1 and P2 assume such a 
distinction. In order to make the indispensability argument work we must already 
have in hand a viable criterion C by which we can distinguish statements 
involving mathematical entities from statements of empirical science. Otherwise 
we would have no way to establish P2, i.e. that some specifically mathematical 
entities are indispensable to any scientific theory. This is because we would have 
no way to determine which statements concern mathematical entities and it might 
turn out that unbeknownst to us there are no mathematical entities involved in 
science at all. If that were true, then the indispensability argument would just be 
pointless. Similarly, absent some criterion to ground the principled difference 
between mathematical and scientific statements we would have no way to 
determine that we ought to be ontologically committed to. This is because we 
could not follow P1––the claim that the only entities that we should be committed 
to are those that are indispensable only to our scientific theories––in practice if we 
do not know what count as specifically scientific claims and what count as 
statements of pure mathematics. 
What all of this ultimately appears to imply about discriminating pure 
mathematics from empirical science within the Quinean framework should now be 
apparent and it is deeply troubling. Namely, there is no obvious way to ground the 
clearly real and important distinction between the empirical sciences and pure 
mathematics in light of orthodox Quinean principles. Quine explicitly recognizes 
in his 1951 article that the statements of pure mathematics are as revisable as those 
of any empirical science, but does not appear to see how deeply that this threatens 
the very distinction between the two types of statements and between the two 
disciplines. What he does not recognize is that his views, when taken together, 
threaten the identity conditions for mathematical and empirical statements. Quine 
himself seems only to have recognized that at the superficial level the difference 
between the mathematical elements of our belief systems and the more properly 
                                                        
7 See Quine, “On What There Is.” 
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empirical elements is one of degree of entrenchment in our belief system. More 
specifically, typically then the propositions of mathematics are supposed to be 
more deeply entrenched than the propositions of empirical theories. But, that is 
just to say that when our belief system faces falsification we are (typically) 
psychologically less inclined to give up the propositions of pure mathematics than 
we are to give up observation statements or more properly empirical statements of 
the empirical sciences. But, this is nothing more than a difference in psychological 
attitudes towards those types of statements which (1) is itself totally ungrounded 
on a theoretical level––although it does serve to explain the “felt” necessity of 
mathematics, and (2) which may vary across individuals. Nevertheless, this simply 
and directly implies that there is no obvious, principled and theoretically grounded 
criterion C that can be used to make distinction between the statements of pure 
mathematics and the statements of the empirical sciences within the Quinean 
corpus. So, for Quineans it appears to be the case that there really is no identifiable 
principled difference between science and pure mathematics. But, this conclusion 
is wildly implausible given the practice of both mathematics and the empirical 
sciences and it renders the indispensability argument incoherent. Moreover, if 
Quineans simply fall back to the view that conformational holism is ultimately the 
source of support for all statements in the web of belief––including those of 
mathematics––and thus fixes ontological commitment, it would simply be a 
concession that the indispensability argument is simply irrelevant because that 
would require conceding P1. Doing so would also presumably entail the kind of 
indiscriminate and comprehensive Platonism that is at odds with the conservative 
nature of Quine’s attitude towards the existence of mathematical entities in 
particular and abstract objects in general as forcefully argued for in his 1960a and 
which is clearly precluded by P1. Quine wants us to commit only to the existence 
of those mathematical entities that are in fact indispensable to science and not 
indiscriminately to the existence of all mathematical entities. So, especially given 
the “no entity without identity” principle, Quineans need to acknowledge the 
problem and to provide a principled manner in which pure mathematics can be 
distinguished from empirical science that retains all––or at least most––of the basic 
Quinean views and which allows us to makes sense of the indispensability 
arguments. However, it is not at all clear how this might be accomplished while 
retaining the core of Quine’s argument against the viability of the analytic/ 
synthetic distinction. So, Quine’s views may simply be inconsistent when it comes 
to this particular issue. 
